The Staff Non-Commissioned Officer’s (SNCO) responsibility to be the link between enlisted Marines and developing junior officers is one of the most critical relationships in the Marine Corps. The role of the SNCO is to share knowledge from their experience and offer sound advice to develop junior officers. The SNCO’s mentorship will ensure the leadership team, and the command is ready to overcome sophisticated threats in any environment. A SNCO’s role is to lead, and an officer’s role is to command, not that officers are not leaders, but as commanders, their leadership is more strategic. They are the decision-makers, and they shoulder the responsibility of accomplishing the mission at stake. The officer is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the unit or mission.

First, it is crucial to understand that developing the relationship between the junior officer and SNCO is a delicate process. One wrong word or attitude can ruin the young officer or create a negative mindset towards SNCOs, which can last throughout an entire career. SNCOs need to approach junior officers without an attitude of superiority. There is no benefit to trying and impressing the new officer with how much experience a SNCO has or tell them how insufficient their knowledge is. If the SNCO shows intolerance toward young officers, it can be counterproductive. The appearance of intolerance often causes them to stop asking questions, which leads to mistakes. It is the responsibility of the SNCO to recognize, act on, and correct the errors by turning them into learning opportunities, understanding that it is far better to learn in a training environment than to make mistakes in war .

Importantly, a SNCO has amassed wisdom and experience from years of service and mentorship vice a brick and mortar school. SNCOs will use this knowledge to mentor the officer, and the SNCO must take responsibility for showing the officer the skills needed to command Marines effectively. Acknowledging that the junior officer is the leader and they oversee the section or platoon should be the priority when a new officer takes command. This issue is a crucial step because the officer must understand that while the unit’s success will mostly result from the Marines’ efforts, as the officer, the ultimate responsibility for the unit’s success or failure falls on them. As well, the officer must know that they can completely rely on their SNCO for their full support. New officers learn from their first day at Officer Candidate School to seek advice and experience from their SNCOs. SNCOs are expected to be competent and be able to guide and give recommendations to their officer counterpart. SNCOs need to do everything in their power to ensure that the junior officer quickly learns the leadership skills they may need in times of war. The SNCO can provide the expertise that will produce a “decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy for “fighting smart.” (Warfighting, p. 4-26)

The SNCO plays a critical role in the Marine Corps by using their many years of experience to train and inspire confidence into junior officers to ensure they grow into competent leaders in the future. The Marine Corps will continue to succeed on and off the battlefield if the relationship between junior officers and SNCOs is continuously developed through the passing of knowledge and valuable advice. The impact a SNCO will have on a junior officer is everlasting, and they will utilize the skills learned throughout their entire career.

Question 1: Does preparation for success against irregular threats aid the Marine Corps’ ability to fight and win a major war against a near-peer competitor or is it a detriment? Why?

Question 2: What is the role of a Marine SNCO in the development of young officers so the leadership team is prepared to overcome the challenges presented by complex environments and threats?

Question 3: Maneuver warfare requires the development of a bias for action—intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative—down to the lowest levels. Is this bias for action as relevant to irregular warfare as it is to traditional warfare? Why?